TRIBAL CLASHES UNDERMINE THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND STABILITY IN LIBYA

TRIBAL CLASHES UNDERMINE THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND STABILITY IN LIBYA: There Is No Space and Time for Whimsical Tribal Ideologies In This Day And Age

Associated Press

Libya has recently witnessed a series of tribal clashes that left several people dead and wounded.  These clashes are not restricted to one group or geographical area of Libya. They happen across the country and have become significantly deadlier since the revolution. 


Since Libya is home to over 140 tribes and clans, strife and competition between these groups has always been part of the Libyan landscape.

In theory, Gaddafi’s ‘Al-Jamahiriya’ system was supposed to function through direct democracy and popular committees. In reality his regime survived with system of patronage coupled with the exploitation of tribal cleavages and brutal repression.  Yet the recent of these clashes can be directly linked to the fallout of the revolution. 

The fall of the old regime brought with it the mass proliferation of weaponry and the collapse of the thinly stretched state security apparatus. Furthermore, the revolution deepened the polarization of allegiances, often pinning tribes supporting Gaddafi against those that rose against him. All of this creates an environment of insecurity and animosity that can make a simple dispute between individual members spiral into a deadly fight between entire communities.  

The most recent clash took place on 11/03/2013 in Sebha between members of the Wirfalla and Qadhadhfa tribes.  At least four people are reported dead and a dozen wounded. Sebha has been the theatre of tribal clashes involving other tribes. Earlier in January the area saw clashes between Qadhadhfa and Awlad Suleiman tribes that left scores of dead and wounded.  

Both the Wirfalla and Awlad Suleiman tribes were hostile to the former regime and fought against Gaddafi’s Tribe of Qadhadhfa during the revolution. Such conflicts are not limited to Sebha; the Nafusa Mountain town of Mizdah has also seen significant tribal strife that began on 02/03/3012. Mashashiya tribesmen fought members of the Al-Qantrar tribe. Both groups have a history of violent clashes. In 2012 fighting between the two tribes and their respective allies left over 100 people dead.

Given the magnitude of the changes sweeping the country and the fragile state of Libyan stability, there is no space and time for whimsical tribal ideologies in this day and age. Libyans cannot afford another revolution. Regardless of which tribes are involved or where it is taking place, the outcomes is always the same.

Besides the unnecessary death and injury of combatants/civilians, violent clashes often cause the suspension of all social activity. Schools and local businesses are often closed down during these disruptions. Furthermore, attacks on property can destroy local infrastructure and amenities causing disruptions to civil life. Yet the responsibility for these affairs cannot be entirely blamed on conflicting tribes. The current government should do more to help these regions overcome their differences.      

The lack of a strong governmental presence in the region exacerbates the Crisis:

Unrest and insecurity have continued to plague the south of Libya since the end of the revolution, with the state exercising minimal control over many areas. In December 2012, Congress representatives for the region walked out of parliament in protest of the deteriorating situation of their constituencies and the “crippling silence” of the central authorities in Tripoli.

The political vacuum and the absence of central government from the area foster an environment suitable for the proliferation of gangs and armed criminals that are often behind many of the clashes. The central government should make its presence felt in these troubled areas and dedicate more resources on the ground.

To be fair, tribalism in Libya runs deep and cannot be eradicated overnight.  Only a gradual and relentless approach will eliminate tribal violence from Libyan society.

The most important factor behind the violence remains the absence of basic security and the widespread availability of weapons. In the short term, these are the first issues the government should tackle not only in areas of tribal fighting, but throughout the Libyan territory.

 Secondly, the central authorities need to establish the primacy of the rule of law and build the necessary institutions to maintain it.  This is a long term effort that cannot be imposed from Tripoli and has to arise from local consent. The current relationship with the influential tribal elders need to be strengthened and weaved into the structure of new institutions or these would fail.

Libyans should embrace their eclectic culture and how each tribe contributes to the country’s social fabric. Cultural/tribal differences and allegiances should not be exploited by petty politics. Such instrumentalization is a divisive force than can only lead the country down the path of violence and destruction. Gaddafi relied on such strategies to maintain his grip on power. Yet, the new authorities possess something far more powerful: democratic legitimacy and the opportunity to create a Libya where inclusive institutions and the rule of law trump old ideologies and tribal kinship. 

H.T

Libya’s Culture of Corruption: Threat to democracy

Libya’s Culture of Corruption threatens the Democratic Gains of the Revolution.

This week, the Libyan Justice Minister Salah Margani urged the Attorney General to release the newspaper editor Amara Abdalla Al-Khatabi who had been arrested on the 19/12/2012 following the publication of a list containing the name of 84 judges allegedly involved in corruption.

The phenomenon of corruption is neither new to Libya nor unique to the country. However, comparing Libya to the rest of the world paints a grim picture. NATO estimated that Gaddafi and his associates had around $150 billion stashed abroad. In 2012, Libya ranked 160^th amongst the 176 countries covered by Transparency International’s authoritative Corruption Perception Index. An improvement from the previous year (2011: 168/176), but it till classifies Libya as a highly corrupt country.

The scourge of corruption has long been identified as a major problem by the new regime.  As the leader of the National Transition Council (NTC), Mustapha Abdul Jalil had acknowledged in that it would take years to overcome the “heavy heritage’ of corruption in Libya. Yet, allegations of corruptions surfaced during the turbulent period of NTC rule.

Two scandals emerged in 2012 surrounding funds set up to compensate revolutionary fighters and their medical treatment abroad, respectively. Both funds were eventually halted due to widespread misuse and fraud.  Commenting on the medical-fund scandal, former Interim Health Minister Fatima Hamroush clarified the prevailing attitudes succinctly when she said: “there was a fear from a dictator and that’s why order was kept without law basically. Law wasn’t applied, but there was order. Now there’s no order, everything’s a mess because there’s no fear”.

The scandals draw attention to two issues concerning corruption in Libya. Firstly, they point to the authorities’ ineptness in curtailing corruption. Secondly, they highlight the prevalence of a ‘culture of corruption’. The head of Libya’s Audit Bureau Ibrahim Belkheir acknowledged the widespread nature of the problem amongst Libyans:  “As they are so used to it, it does not seem to be corruption to them."

While it is worth noting that this was a turbulent time for the country, the issue of corruption and government’s will (or lack thereof) to tackle it remains in the headlines. On 18/01/2013 Prime Minister Ali Zeidan announced a number of measures taken by his administration to fight corruption. These included close cooperation with the Audit Bureau, the establishment of a central bidding committee to ensure transparency in contract awards, enlisting the help of the secret service in investigations, and new measures to prevent irregular recruitment of government employees. He also urged the Libyan people to play their part and to report those who violate the law.

Zeidan’s government appears committed to curbing corruption, at least on the surface. The Prime Minister’s 23/02/2013 surpriseannouncement about the sacking of a number of government officials allegedly involved in corruption. Details and names have yet to emerge, but Zeidan did stress that he “will not allow the misuse of public funds and I will take the strongest procedures against corruption”. Due to the lack of details or subsequent action, the statement should be seen as more than populist rhetoric. It should interpret as a warning addressed to all officials including those under investigations. Zeidan’s words have yet to turn to action as a recent whistleblower case indicates.

The government seems unable or unwilling to address public accounts of alleged corruption. The deputy minister of Culture and Civil Society, Ms. Awatif al-Tushani, announced her resignation on 7/02/2013 citing alleged financial and administrative irregularities in the ministry.  She claims to have raised such issues to the Prime Minister, but no action was taken. Furthermore, reports indicate that she was forced to resign and that her stand against dishonest practices at the ministry made her a target for personal harassment.

A more comprehensive approach needs to be taken by the Libyan Government. The International anti-corruption group Global Witness says that the new government should learn from the previous regime’s practices and implement reforms in Libya’s oil and gas sector. The strategic importance of the sector and the prevalence of shady practices in the industry make this the most important area for reform the new government.

Global Witness’ ‘blueprint for reforms’ (2012) should provide sufficient guidance to prevent large-scale corruption in the new Libya. Their recommendations include the promotion of transparency through the publication of all existing and future oil contracts, to work with international audit organisations to improve accounting and auditing practice within the National Oil Company so that revenues can be accurately measured and reported on. Furthermore, real commitment to transparency should be enshrined into Libya's new constitution, and all current and future contracts should be subject to parliamentary scrutiny.

Nothing could indicate a stronger commitment to fighting corruption and illegal practices than a comprehensive reform in the oil sector. Such actions would not only promote an image of ‘responsible governance’ but would improve the trust of Libyans in their nascent democratic institutions. It would also facilitate  a change in the entrenched attitudes about corruption at both the institutional and individual levels.

LIBYA, TWO YEARS AFTER GADDAFI: Insecurity and future prospects

A monopoly over the legitimate use of violence- the hallmark of a sovereign state- must be regained by the Libyan government. Security issues remain the priority, as they prevent every other sector of the society from progressing.

Thousands of people marched through the streets of Benghazi to celebrate the second anniversary of the Libyan revolution. Though most gatherings celebrated the events that brought down Gaddafi’s regime, many demonstrators also criticized the government lack of action on reforms and called for more decentralized control from Tripoli. The Libyan government also reinforced security and surveillance capabilities around Tripoli and other cities.

Though the odds of an armed uprising remain relatively small, renewed calls for change have found enough resonance amongst the population to incite a response from the government. Prime Minister Ali Zaidan’s announcement came as a response to calls for a ‘second revolution’ from citizens in Bani Walid, Benghazi and Tripoli. Additionally, various civil society groups aim to organize protests against the government’s slow progress on reforms. The rise of critical voices points to growing dissatisfaction amongst Libya’s citizens and the myriad of challenges the government faces.

Perhaps the biggest issue remains one of basic security. Armed militias continue to escape the control of the government and High profile incidents such as the September attack on the US consulate in Benghazi only highlight the government’s inability to cope and provide the basic provision of security within its borders.

Armed militiamen continue to roam freely the streets of many Libyan towns, often demanding special treatment because of their ‘services’ during the war.

An international Libya support conference was held in Paris on the 12 February to discuss the most pertinent issues affecting Libya. All participants agreed that the most pressing issues affecting Libya are security and the lack of solid institutions to promote justice and the rule of law. Two plans to make progress on these areas were announced at the end of the meeting.

Strategic cities such as Benghazi-Libya’s economic hub and the bastion of the revolution- provide a stark example of broken institutions and lawlessness. Benghazi has witnessed a rising tide of kidnappings, bombings and assassinations, often targeting government and security officials. The lack of basic security hampers the ability of local authorities to provide basic social provisions such as garbage collection. Though symbolically integrated within the national security apparatus, armed militias outman and outgun local police and continue to control key parts of the city. Arrests are seldom made out of fear of reprisal attacks and kidnappings.

The town has historically been wary of centralized control from Tripoli. The inability of the government to meet the expectations of its citizens has renewed calls for a return to a federalist arrangement. This would significantly weaken the government and could set a precedent for other regions to do the same.

Security problems are not exclusive to isolated hamlets or destroyed cities like Benghazi. Tripoli has had its fair share of violence. Assassination attempts on government and security officials as well as kidnappings are common occurrences. The General National Congress (GNC) has been stormed by protesters and militiamen on a number of occasions, and its president Mohamed Magarief survived an assassination attempt on 4 January 2013.

The violence during the revolution already had a serious impact on the stability of the region. Many experts point to the flow of weapons and fighters from the Libyan conflict towards Mali as a major cause in the security deterioration in the Sahel. Despite having closed all borders, the Libyan territory continues to be a transit hub and the home of Islamist militants active in the region. The attackers of a gas facility in neighboring Algeria are reported to have crossed from Libya and to have benefited from the inadequate security provisions on the border.

Instability is a hallmark of most post revolutionary environments; however, the issue is compounded in Libya due to the proliferation of weapons around the country. The centralized approach of the Gaddafi regime is untenable due to the power and influence exercised by militia-backed local councils. This has favored the emergence of a weaker central government unable to impose its authority. A more confrontational approach would risk a return to violence and greater instability.

With populations demanding greater autonomy from the Tripoli, the government’s only suitable course of action is further decentralization. Yet, security issues are likely to persist if local authorities are not willing to take a more institutionalized approach to the problem.

The transitional authorities mitigated the risks of violence against the state and its interests through social spending programs and direct cash payments to militia members. The Zaidan government should adopt a similar approach to replace the chaotic rule of armed factions with the rule of law. Redistributive policies should focus on local institutions rather than individuals. This would facilitate the integration of local factions into official state institutions and bestow the government in Tripoli with greater legitimacy.

As Libyans mark two years of rule without Gaddafi, the monopoly over the legitimate use of violence- the hallmark of a sovereign state- must be regained by the government. The immense task of rebuilding a nation after a civil war that destroyed vital infrastructure and addressing the aspirations of the Libyan people make security issues the priority, as they prevent every other sector of the society from progressing. The establishment of legitimate institutions and the rule of law are essential to avoid jeopardizing the gains of the revolution. Fortunately, The Paris conference produced a consensus, and a plan to address the issues. It is now up to Libyans to take the necessary steps for a successful democratic transition and prosperous future.

Houssem Tefiani

The Tunisian Response (updated)

Tunisia’s response to the intervention in Mali: continuity of non-interventionist foreign policy?

When the French Air-Force began bombarding Jihadist Militant positions in Northern Mali, Tunisia Foreign Ministry expressed its opposition to the move. However, a more supportive stance was voiced later by Foreign Minister Rafik Abdessalem. This change in attitude and reports of contradictory views from other members of government prompt a deeper look at the current regime’s foreign policy agenda and the impact the current crisis in Mali is having on the ruling establishment.

Historically, Tunisia’s foreign policy foundations were set by the country’s first President Habib Bourguiba. After independence from France, Tunisia’s diplomacy gained international respect and credibility. Notable diplomatic achievements include the election Mongi Slim as the first African President of the UN’s General Assembly and the hosting of the Arab League’s headquarters up to 1991 in Tunisia.  Under Bourguiba, the country’s moderate credentials were boosted by joining the Non-Aligned movement and the development of close ties with the West.

Under Ben Ali, the Bourgubist pro-western stance continued to dominate the country’s foreign policy agenda, and somewhat deepened following the country’s economic liberalization.  The country’s economy grew at an average rate of nearly 5% over the last decade. The stability of the country was based on a bargain between an authoritarian government that ensured large segments of the population benefited from social and economic gains; however, this broke down because the Ben Ali regime’s strategy did not provide enough employment for young, educated segments of the population, the likes of Mohamed Bouazizi i.e. the catalyst of the Jasmine Revolution and subsequently, the Arab Spring.

 The new government faces revolution-related disruptions as well as the effects of the Libyan conflict.Though a minority, Salafists have proliferated after the revolution and routinely clash with other political groups. The ruling Ennahda party has been accused of pandering to the Salafists and using them to intimidate society. Dissatisfaction with the new government has increased since Ben ali was deposed two years ago. Regional disparities, and a lack of employment-the same issues that brought down Ben Ali- continue to fuel protest actions against the government.  

Under the current regime, Tunisia’s foreign policy has witnessed a rapprochement with GCC countries, notably Qatar. This partially explained by ideological affinities on both sides, as well as the current government’s need of attracting foreign investors. Moreover, the visit of president Marzouki to France to mend diplomatic relations (France was a staunch supporter of the Ben Ali regime and is Tunisia’s biggest economic partner) indicates the primacy of economic issues for the post-revolutionary government.  

How does this fit in with the Conflict in Mali?

Tunisia’s response appears to be building on in its traditional foreign policy of non-alignment and preference for political solutions. However, an intervention in Mali raises the specter of political instability within Tunisian borders on three levels. 

Firstly, via domestic Jihadists, who have proliferated in the post-revolutionary climate. Such groups, could carry attacks against western interests in the country, or against the regime if it is seen cooperating with the enemy. Furthermore, such attacks would not be reassuring to any potential foreign investors.

Secondly, there is as the risk of the country becoming a ‘corridor’ for weapons and Jihadists from Libya operating in the region. Armed Groups have been active on the border with Algeria even prior to the intervention, but the conflict in Mali is likely increase Tunisia’s exposure despite its distance from Mali. 

finally,  reports indicate a number of Tunisian Jihadists are fighting in Mali, and as revealed by the recent attack in Algeria ,11 militants out of 30 were Tunisian. The presence of active Tunisian Jihadist group in the conflict could have a ‘blow-back- effect on the country. The Algerian Jihadists that fought in Afghanistan and their role in the turmoil of the 1990s provide a  good lesson. Additionally, the context of widespread dissatisfaction with the current ruling regime amplifies this risk. The government’s inability to deliver on its promises after two years in power could create a large pool of disenfranchised youths ripe for recruitment by the Jihadists.

As many parties brought to power with the wave of the Arab spring, the current Tunisian government has to move from a mere opposition party to a governing regime. a task that is now further complicated by domestic issues,regional instability, and the weakness of its security apparatus. Not only does this renders It's position vis-a-vis the Intervention in Mali comprehensible,it also highlights the importance of the tiny nation in the Maghreb's current climate of instability.

Houssem Tefiani

Further reading:

http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/tunisia-signs-of-domestic-radicalization-post-revolution

http://carnegieendowment.org/files/tunisia_economy.pdf

NEXT: Tunisia's reaction to the Intervention: Foreign Policy test?

The Tunisian government has expressed unequivocal opposition to the French intervention in Mali. The Foreign Minister Rafik Abdessalem reiterated his country's opposition to 'foreign intervention of any kind'. It would be interesting to compare Tunisia's reaction to the intervention in Mali to the NATO intervention in Libya and gauge the current regime's foreign policy. Furthermore, domestic problems including the threat of local Jihadists should also taken into account to help explain the Tunisian policy.

At this point this only a scribble of ideas. A full piece will be published after a decent research to keep things factually grounded and balanced.

Thoughts and comments are always welcome, a Tunisian perspective is always welcome.

at Maghreb Caravan we aim to only serve the freshest of political Couscous 

Algerian Crisis: Analysis of Algeria's reaction

Algeria's Hostage Crisis:The Algerian Response,Motives and consequences.

The Algerian National Press Agency had released a preliminary assessment on 19/01/2013 stating that 23 had been killed, 32 terrorists neutralized. Nearly 800 hostages were freed including 107 foreigners. However, The Algerian Minster of Communication Mohamed Said, said on 20/01/2013 that these were provisional figures, and the numbers of those killed is likely to be higher (press conference by Prime Minister Sella: 37 foreigners dead). 

The assault came as a surprise to most outsiders, including Washington, London and Paris. All claim not to have been consulted by the Algerian prior to the assault. Yet following the release of information about the scale and overall results of the operation, all have expressed greater support for counter-terrorism efforts in the region. Given that the intervention in Mali still requires Algeria's support is perhaps another reason for the change in rhetoric.   

Many observers have deemed the Algerian response heavy-handed  or brutal.The Minister of Communications summed up Algeria’s policy with respect to negotiations quite clearly when he stated: “No negotiation, no blackmail and no respite against terrorism”. However, an overview of Algeria’s historical legacy, the current regional dynamics and factors specific to the crisis at In Amenas provide a better understanding of Algeria’s hard-line policy and actions.

The Algerian Army launched the assault on the gas installation south  east of the capital Algiers after a group of Jihadists calling themselves the ‘Signers in Blood’; took over the installation and captured over 600 hostages including a large number of foreigners. The operation lasted over three days and details are starting to slowly emerge. 

Historically, Algeria’s ‘dark decade’ continues to shape the country’s counter-terrorism policy. Throughout the 1990s, the country armed forces fought Islamist Militant in a bloody war with casualties including a large number of civilians. During the crisis, the ruling military establishment- Algeria’s core centre of power- was divided into two camps: those in favour of dialogue and the ‘eradicators’. Despite a return to civil rule, it is the latter that continue to hold key posts in the country’s security apparatus.

After more than a decade of fighting, and a brokered political solution, the country managed to push what it labels ‘residual terrorism’ south of major population centres and into the Sahel region. It is around this time that the rules of the game changed for both the armed Islamist- now franchised Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) - and for the government. In 2003 European tourists were taken hostage and released upon an alleged ransom payment. The same group went on to perpetrate the country’s first suicide attack in 2007. Thus, Algerian authorities see any negotiation or interjection from outside countries as not only a breach of sovereignty, but also a direct security risk stemming from better armed groups.

The assault should also be seen in the larger context of instability in the region and the implications of this for the Algerian ruling regime. Firstly, Civil war in Libya brought instability and heightened the threat of Islamist armed militants on the country’s eastern flank, where Algeria’s oil and gas operations are most concentrated (fig.1). Furthermore, instability in Northern Mali became an additional source of insecurity. The vast porous borders-imaginary lines in the sand- and the inherent weakness of bordering states in the region create an ideal operating environment for armed groups. This helps both explain Algeria’s push for a political solution in Mali as well as its harsh response at home.

Figure 1

The attack on the gas installation itself constitutes a first in the country’s history. These were largely untouched during the instability of the 1990s. The country’s economy is largely based on its oil and gas exports, which account for over 90% of all exports. The In Amenas installation itself accounts for 10% of Algeria’s gas production and nearly 20% of its exports, all in an economy dominated by the public sector. Thus the oil and gas exports are not only the backbone of the economy, but the pillar of political and social stability for the country. The militant attacked a core interest or as Dr. Geoff Porter put it: ‘the golden goose that keeps the regime’. In this light, the Algerian overwhelming response should be regarded as clear message to both militants and outside powers. 

In the aftermath of the operation of In Amenas, a number of questions remain to be answered including what exactly happened at the gas facility and how a security breach of this scale was ever possible. Early reports indicate the use of embedded operatives by the militants to gain strategic intelligence inside the plant and the whereabouts of foreign employees. One Algerian employee reported that the militant knew their way around and had even known about a planned strike.

How this will affect Algeria’s stance on the Mali conflict? Past behaviour and the current policy points towards a more ‘hunker-down bunker-up’ Algerian response. The Algerian government is maintaining its usual silence, but greater involvement cannot be ruled out. Reports show the Algerian Air force has been put on standby, and additional troops have been dispatched towards the Malian border.