Saturday, 13 April 2013

The evolution of Terrorism in North Africa French Documentary review + McAl Qaeda: Why regional Salafi Terrorist Groups Join Al-Qaeda and its effects on the Group: Classifying Al-Qaeda and its links to regional organizations.

The evolution of Terrorism in North Africa French Documentary review 


An insightful French documentary about the development of terrorism in Algeria, and the evolution of national organizations into global actors.


produced by Barberis / length: 70 minutes /Public Sénat April 2011



The evolution of terrorist organizations in Algeria and abroad are adequately covered by the documentary. Yet, the most interesting Analysis can be found towards the end:

Here are some Interesting points seldom mentioned in bite size news snippets covering the subject: 

  • The rise and  more importantly the 'fall' of Al-Qaida on the global level.
  • The rise of AQIM and it's development into a 'criminal organization'
  • The devolution from a centralized organized entity to more fractured local actors. 
  • The threat to current and potential economic interests in the Sahel posed by these groups. 
  • The use of real/exaggerated terrorist threat by local and powerful states to further their own interest in the region. 
Though the above points being raised are a refreshing take on events. It is clear that the documentary was made in 2011 and fails to take into account the recent developments in the area i.e:  
  • The fall of the Qaddafi regime and its consequences on the region. 
    • Mass proliferation of weapons and fighters from Libya into the Sahel. 
    • The rise of Jihadist ideology in Tunisia and Libya. 
  • Algeria's defensive stance, and it's lack of will to take a leading role in the crisis
    • Algeria's military untested outside of the country. 
    • Risk averse ruling regime is extra sensitive to the 'sea of instability' around it:
      • Libya's unruly situation. 
      • Development of Jihadists in Tunisia. 
      • The current crisis in Mali.


Supplementing the above information, we have posted an excerpt from a research paper undertaken in 2011. The aim was to analyse the evolution of local organizations and the internal and external factors that lead to adopt Al-Qaeda's creed. 

The excerpt contains the theoretical background for paper and the relevant theories used. If the rest of the paper is of interest to anyone, we will publish it when it is requested.   


Monday, 1 April 2013

Tribal animosities and militia rule tarnish Libya's human rights record and democratic credentials.


Tribal animosities and militia rule tarnish Libya's human rights record and democratic credentials.

remi ochlik

Hassan Al Amin, the chairman of the Human Rights and Civil Society Committee and a long time Gaddafi opposition figure, resigned earlier this month following numerous death threats. Justifying his decision, he cited his inability to conduct his work as chairman in an increasingly polarised political environment .

Al Amin's high profile resignation serves as a reminder of the reality of Libya's new 'democratic' rule and the state of human rights in the country. The authoritative annual report published by Human Rights Watch for 2013 reveals that Libya continues to be plagued by serious rights abuses, including arbitrary arrests, torture, and deaths in detention.

Like many Libyans, Al Amin believes that the GNC has strayed from its mission and obligations towards the Libyan people. It has failed to deliver on the most important issues affecting the country during the ongoing transitional period.

The GNC has already deferred the drafting of a new constitution to an unforeseeable time and has been unable to maintain adequate oversight over governmental program. Critics have also pointed to the GNC's failure to implement a coherent plan of national reconciliation and transitional justice.
Al Amin's views and his will to foster the respect of human rights in Libya have earned him a number of enemies, particularly in his electorate district of Misrata.

Misrata provides an illustrative and bleak example of everything that is wrong with Libya today.
The town is a place where lawlessness, the "rule of the gun" and a dubious 'revolutionary legitimacy' are vaunted by armed militias. They have come to trump the democratically elected local representatives and civil law.

Like elsewhere in Libya, Misrata's prisons are filled with those captured during the chaos and in the aftermath of the revolution. Militiamen allegedly guarding these facilities subject their captives to inhuman and degrading treatment. Arbitrary detentions, torture and murder are a common occurrence; perpetrated by the very men supposed to prevent them. Accountability is non-existent and government officials tasked with preventing the abuse such as Al Amin are branded traitors and threatened for merely doing their job.

Though these issues affect the whole of Libya, the current situation in Misrata fully captures the toxic legacy of tribalism has had on the country.

Gaddafi maintained his hold on power by manipulating old tribal grudges against his opponents. Applying the clausewitz's concept of war being the continuation of policy by other means, it is easy to see how tribal cleavages that kept Gaddafi in power determined which groups supported the revolution and which groups did not.

Entire tribes whose members supported the old regime against the revolutionaries have been targeted by revenge killings and abuse by armed militias while central authorities turn a blind eye.

For example, the people of Tawergha are unable to return to their city out of fear of revenge from Misrata Militias. Tawerghians allied themselves with the Gaddafi regime during the revolution. They participated in the siege of neighbouring city of Misrata and now face persecution.

Tawerghans have been targeted for arrest and attack by Misrata's Militias, who accuse people from Tawergha of committing serious crimes against them during the war. It is reported that around 1,300 people from Tawergha are detained, missing, or dead.

Human Rights Watch went as far as stating that abuses committed against Tawerghians may amount to crimes against humanity and could be prosecuted by the International Criminal Court.
The image of Libya as a poster-child for successful democratic transition has been tarnished by the brush of tribal lawlessness. If the GNC does not take immediate and substantial steps to remedy the situation on the ground, it risks turning the current regime into the very thing Libyans fought and died to overthrow.

Breaking the spiral of violence:

If the GNC fails to act, the current status quo is likely to have disastrous consequences for the country and its citizens. Tribal feuds can spiral into a never ending vendetta of revenge killings. Neutralizing militias remains the most basic prerequisite for implementing a system of governance based on justice and the rule of law. Laws and policies cannot be drafted when neither the parliament nor the Prime Minister's office are safe from armed groups storming them.
Though grievances against the old regime are justifiable, forcing officials chosen by the ballot out of office with the barrel of a gun goes against the core principals of public office in a democracy. Claiming authority through 'revolutionary legitimacy' is merely the exercise of control through fear and violence, the hallmarks of Gaddafi's regime.

Reconciliation is the first building bloc for a successful transition. The GNC should therefore deliver on its promise to make reconciliation a priority. It ensures the return of dignity and justice to all who have been wronged , allowing everyone to move forward without being hampered by the past.
Reconciliation must be followed up by an inclusive development program. Young Libyans in Militias must be incentivized with alternative sources of income and better prospects to develop as law abiding citizens.

Finally, NGOs and officials overseeing the application of the law and the respect of human rights should be treated as partners of the Government. A robust civil society strengthens the rule of law and discourages 'tribal justice'.

Friday, 29 March 2013

FEATURED PUBLICATION: SAHEL PRESS REVIEW:









This week we feature our first guest publication. The latest comes from our friends and esteemed colleagues from the SAHEL PRESS REVIEWS 

SPRs provides revealing insights and perspectives from the Sahel and West African through Press Reviews of local News, Press, and Media Agencies. With recent events in Mali and elsewhere, the Sahel is recieving its deserved attention from the international community, albiet for tragic reasons.

A large portion of the information provided by international news agencies often lacks detailed context, and tend to be a rerun of French news agencies.

Seasoned political analysts wishing to have their ears closer to the ground should use more localized information as it is richer in both context and detail.

By regrouping insightful local sources and translating these into English, our friends at the Sahel Press Reviews facilitate access to pertinent information for locals wishing to learn more about their region and provide an insider's perspective for those outside.

We thank you SPRs for helping the voice of local news echo beyond the Sahel.

As always, share enjoy without moderation, and share the Cous Cous


















Tuesday, 12 March 2013

TRIBAL CLASHES UNDERMINE THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND STABILITY IN LIBYA


TRIBAL CLASHES UNDERMINE THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND STABILITY IN LIBYA: There Is No Space and Time for Whimsical Tribal Ideologies In This Day And Age

Associated Press
Libya has recently witnessed a series of tribal clashes that left several people dead and wounded.  These clashes are not restricted to one group or geographical area of Libya. They happen across the country and have become significantly deadlier since the revolution. 


Since Libya is home to over 140 tribes and clans, strife and competition between these groups has always been part of the Libyan landscape.


In theory, Gaddafi’s ‘Al-Jamahiriya’ system was supposed to function through direct democracy and popular committees. In reality his regime survived with system of patronage coupled with the exploitation of tribal cleavages and brutal repression.  Yet the recent of these clashes can be directly linked to the fallout of the revolution. 

The fall of the old regime brought with it the mass proliferation of weaponry and the collapse of the thinly stretched state security apparatus. Furthermore, the revolution deepened the polarization of allegiances, often pinning tribes supporting Gaddafi against those that rose against him. All of this creates an environment of insecurity and animosity that can make a simple dispute between individual members spiral into a deadly fight between entire communities.  

The most recent clash took place on 11/03/2013 in Sebha between members of the Wirfalla and Qadhadhfa tribes.  At least four people are reported dead and a dozen wounded. Sebha has been the theatre of tribal clashes involving other tribes. Earlier in January the area saw clashes between Qadhadhfa and Awlad Suleiman tribes that left scores of dead and wounded.  

Both the Wirfalla and Awlad Suleiman tribes were hostile to the former regime and fought against Gaddafi’s Tribe of Qadhadhfa during the revolution. Such conflicts are not limited to Sebha; the Nafusa Mountain town of Mizdah has also seen significant tribal strife that began on 02/03/3012. Mashashiya tribesmen fought members of the Al-Qantrar tribe. Both groups have a history of violent clashes. In 2012 fighting between the two tribes and their respective allies left over 100 people dead.


Given the magnitude of the changes sweeping the country and the fragile state of Libyan stability, there is no space and time for whimsical tribal ideologies in this day and age. Libyans cannot afford another revolution. Regardless of which tribes are involved or where it is taking place, the outcomes is always the same.
Besides the unnecessary death and injury of combatants/civilians, violent clashes often cause the suspension of all social activity. Schools and local businesses are often closed down during these disruptions. Furthermore, attacks on property can destroy local infrastructure and amenities causing disruptions to civil life. Yet the responsibility for these affairs cannot be entirely blamed on conflicting tribes. The current government should do more to help these regions overcome their differences.      

The lack of a strong governmental presence in the region exacerbates the Crisis:

Unrest and insecurity have continued to plague the south of Libya since the end of the revolution, with the state exercising minimal control over many areas. In December 2012, Congress representatives for the region walked out of parliament in protest of the deteriorating situation of their constituencies and the “crippling silence” of the central authorities in Tripoli.


The political vacuum and the absence of central government from the area foster an environment suitable for the proliferation of gangs and armed criminals that are often behind many of the clashes. The central government should make its presence felt in these troubled areas and dedicate more resources on the ground.

To be fair, tribalism in Libya runs deep and cannot be eradicated overnight.  Only a gradual and relentless approach will eliminate tribal violence from Libyan society.


The most important factor behind the violence remains the absence of basic security and the widespread availability of weapons. In the short term, these are the first issues the government should tackle not only in areas of tribal fighting, but throughout the Libyan territory.

 Secondly, the central authorities need to establish the primacy of the rule of law and build the necessary institutions to maintain it.  This is a long term effort that cannot be imposed from Tripoli and has to arise from local consent. The current relationship with the influential tribal elders need to be strengthened and weaved into the structure of new institutions or these would fail.

Libyans should embrace their eclectic culture and how each tribe contributes to the country’s social fabric. Cultural/tribal differences and allegiances should not be exploited by petty politics. Such instrumentalization is a divisive force than can only lead the country down the path of violence and destruction. Gaddafi relied on such strategies to maintain his grip on power. Yet, the new authorities possess something far more powerful: democratic legitimacy and the opportunity to create a Libya where inclusive institutions and the rule of law trump old ideologies and tribal kinship. 


H.T

Thursday, 7 March 2013

Libya’s Culture of Corruption: Threat to democracy


Libya’s Culture of Corruption threatens the Democratic Gains of the Revolution.

This week, the Libyan Justice Minister Salah Margani urged the Attorney General to release the newspaper editor Amara Abdalla Al-Khatabi who had been arrested on the 19/12/2012 following the publication of a list containing the name of 84 judges allegedly involved in corruption.

The phenomenon of corruption is neither new to Libya nor unique to the country. However, comparing Libya to the rest of the world paints a grim picture. NATO estimated that Gaddafi and his associates had around $150 billion stashed abroad. In 2012, Libya ranked 160th amongst the 176 countries covered by Transparency International’s authoritative Corruption Perception Index. An improvement from the previous year (2011: 168/176), but it till classifies Libya as a highly corrupt country.

The scourge of corruption has long been identified as a major problem by the new regime.  As the leader of the National Transition Council (NTC), Mustapha Abdul Jalil had acknowledged in that it would take years to overcome the “heavy heritage’ of corruption in Libya. Yet, allegations of corruptions surfaced during the turbulent period of NTC rule.


Two scandals emerged in 2012 surrounding funds set up to compensate revolutionary fighters and their medical treatment abroad, respectively. Both funds were eventually halted due to widespread misuse and fraud.  Commenting on the medical-fund scandal, former Interim Health Minister Fatima Hamroush clarified the prevailing attitudes succinctly when she said: “there was a fear from a dictator and that’s why order was kept without law basically. Law wasn’t applied, but there was order. Now there’s no order, everything’s a mess because there’s no fear”.

The scandals draw attention to two issues concerning corruption in Libya. Firstly, they point to the authorities’ ineptness in curtailing corruption. Secondly, they highlight the prevalence of a ‘culture of corruption’. The head of Libya’s Audit Bureau Ibrahim Belkheir acknowledged the widespread nature of the problem amongst Libyans:  As they are so used to it, it does not seem to be corruption to them."

While it is worth noting that this was a turbulent time for the country, the issue of corruption and government’s will (or lack thereof) to tackle it remains in the headlines. On 18/01/2013 Prime Minister Ali Zeidan announced a number of measures taken by his administration to fight corruption. These included close cooperation with the Audit Bureau, the establishment of a central bidding committee to ensure transparency in contract awards, enlisting the help of the secret service in investigations, and new measures to prevent irregular recruitment of government employees. He also urged the Libyan people to play their part and to report those who violate the law.

Zeidan’s government appears committed to curbing corruption, at least on the surface. The Prime Minister’s 23/02/2013 surpriseannouncement about the sacking of a number of government officials allegedly involved in corruption. Details and names have yet to emerge, but Zeidan did stress that he “will not allow the misuse of public funds and I will take the strongest procedures against corruption”. Due to the lack of details or subsequent action, the statement should be seen as more than populist rhetoric. It should interpret as a warning addressed to all officials including those under investigations. Zeidan’s words have yet to turn to action as a recent whistleblower case indicates.

The government seems unable or unwilling to address public accounts of alleged corruption. The deputy minister of Culture and Civil Society, Ms. Awatif al-Tushani, announced her resignation on 7/02/2013 citing alleged financial and administrative irregularities in the ministry.  She claims to have raised such issues to the Prime Minister, but no action was taken. Furthermore, reports indicate that she was forced to resign and that her stand against dishonest practices at the ministry made her a target for personal harassment.

A more comprehensive approach needs to be taken by the Libyan Government. The International anti-corruption group Global Witness says that the new government should learn from the previous regime’s practices and implement reforms in Libya’s oil and gas sector. The strategic importance of the sector and the prevalence of shady practices in the industry make this the most important area for reform the new government.

Global Witness’ ‘blueprint for reforms’ (2012) should provide sufficient guidance to prevent large-scale corruption in the new Libya. Their recommendations include the promotion of transparency through the publication of all existing and future oil contracts, to work with international audit organisations to improve accounting and auditing practice within the National Oil Company so that revenues can be accurately measured and reported on. Furthermore, real commitment to transparency should be enshrined into Libya's new constitution, and all current and future contracts should be subject to parliamentary scrutiny.
Nothing could indicate a stronger commitment to fighting corruption and illegal practices than a comprehensive reform in the oil sector. Such actions would not only promote an image of ‘responsible governance’ but would improve the trust of Libyans in their nascent democratic institutions. It would also facilitate  a change in the entrenched attitudes about corruption at both the institutional and individual levels.


Wednesday, 6 March 2013

ALGERIA BUDGET 2013 (UPDATE)

A brief breakdown of the Algerian Government's 2013 Budget by Ministerial sectors. Data was obtained directly from the Algerian press Agency .

The Algerian 2013 budget bill was discussed and signed by The President Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA during the cabinet meeting held on the 26th of December in EL MOURADIA. This budget is considered commensurate with the national economy's development level. Since, 6,879.8 billion DZD were allocated to cover the major expenses of the country of which 4,333.6 billion DZD were assigned to the operating budget and 2,544.2 billion DZD to the equipment.

An In-depth analysis of the budget and its implications will follow soon. 
Maghreb Caravan serves the freshest cous cous, that's always worth the wait...

A big thank you to Anas.B. Zerhouni (researcher at Brunel University) for putting together the table.

Secteur
Montant DZD
%
US$
1
Presidence
                     9,305,494,000.00   
0.24%
118330289.93
2
Premier Minstere
                     3,363,654,000.00   
0.09%
42772812.82
3
Defence
                825,860,800,000.00   
20.89%
10501790437.44
4
Interieur
                566,450,318,000.00   
14.33%
7203081358.09
5
AE
                  30,383,812,000.00   
0.77%
386365869.79
6
Justice
                  68,308,983,000.00   
1.73%
868628980.16
7
Finance
                  81,376,609,000.00   
2.06%
1034799198.88
8
EM
                  36,273,458,000.00   
0.92%
461259638.86
9
RE
                  41,056,640,000.00   
1.04%
522083418.11
10
PME PMI
                     4,149,500,000.00   
0.10%
52765768.06
11
Commerce
                  23,114,603,000.00   
0.58%
293929336.22
12
AR
                  23,302,271,000.00   
0.59%
296315755.34
13
Moujahdine
                221,050,281,000.00   
5.59%
2810914051.37
14
Enviro
                     2,711,530,000.00   
0.07%
34480289.93
15
Transport
                  20,022,340,000.00   
0.51%
254607578.84
16
Education
                628,664,041,000.00   
15.91%
7994201945.57
17
Agriculture
                215,686,294,000.00   
5.46%
2742704654.12
18
TP
                     9,923,617,000.00   
0.25%
126190450.15
19
Santé
                306,925,642,000.00   
7.77%
3902920167.85
20
Culture
                  21,604,452,000.00   
0.55%
274725991.86
21
Communication
                  11,813,725,000.00   
0.30%
150225394.20
22
T et artisanat
                     2,710,849,000.00   
0.07%
34471630.21
23
ESRS
                264,582,513,000.00   
6.69%
3364477530.52
24
P TIC
                     3,308,384,000.00   
0.08%
42069989.83
25
R parlement
                        269,375,000.00   
0.01%
3425419.63
26
Formation Pro
                  47,635,070,000.00   
1.21%
605735885.05
27
Habitat
                  15,513,582,000.00   
0.39%
197273423.19
28
Travail SS
                276,503,735,000.00   
7.00%
3516069875.38
29
S et Famille
                154,122,325,000.00   
3.90%
1959846452.19
30
Peche
                     2,230,922,000.00   
0.06%
28368794.51
31
J et Sport
                  34,252,001,000.00   
0.87%
435554437.95
Total

            3,952,476,820,000.00   
100.00%
50260386826.04




DIVIDING THE PIE.