The Tunisian Response (updated)

Tunisia’s response to the intervention in Mali: continuity of non-interventionist foreign policy?

When the French Air-Force began bombarding Jihadist Militant positions in Northern Mali, Tunisia Foreign Ministry expressed its opposition to the move. However, a more supportive stance was voiced later by Foreign Minister Rafik Abdessalem. This change in attitude and reports of contradictory views from other members of government prompt a deeper look at the current regime’s foreign policy agenda and the impact the current crisis in Mali is having on the ruling establishment.

Historically, Tunisia’s foreign policy foundations were set by the country’s first President Habib Bourguiba. After independence from France, Tunisia’s diplomacy gained international respect and credibility. Notable diplomatic achievements include the election Mongi Slim as the first African President of the UN’s General Assembly and the hosting of the Arab League’s headquarters up to 1991 in Tunisia.  Under Bourguiba, the country’s moderate credentials were boosted by joining the Non-Aligned movement and the development of close ties with the West.

Under Ben Ali, the Bourgubist pro-western stance continued to dominate the country’s foreign policy agenda, and somewhat deepened following the country’s economic liberalization.  The country’s economy grew at an average rate of nearly 5% over the last decade. The stability of the country was based on a bargain between an authoritarian government that ensured large segments of the population benefited from social and economic gains; however, this broke down because the Ben Ali regime’s strategy did not provide enough employment for young, educated segments of the population, the likes of Mohamed Bouazizi i.e. the catalyst of the Jasmine Revolution and subsequently, the Arab Spring.

 The new government faces revolution-related disruptions as well as the effects of the Libyan conflict.Though a minority, Salafists have proliferated after the revolution and routinely clash with other political groups. The ruling Ennahda party has been accused of pandering to the Salafists and using them to intimidate society. Dissatisfaction with the new government has increased since Ben ali was deposed two years ago. Regional disparities, and a lack of employment-the same issues that brought down Ben Ali- continue to fuel protest actions against the government.  

Under the current regime, Tunisia’s foreign policy has witnessed a rapprochement with GCC countries, notably Qatar. This partially explained by ideological affinities on both sides, as well as the current government’s need of attracting foreign investors. Moreover, the visit of president Marzouki to France to mend diplomatic relations (France was a staunch supporter of the Ben Ali regime and is Tunisia’s biggest economic partner) indicates the primacy of economic issues for the post-revolutionary government.  

How does this fit in with the Conflict in Mali?

Tunisia’s response appears to be building on in its traditional foreign policy of non-alignment and preference for political solutions. However, an intervention in Mali raises the specter of political instability within Tunisian borders on three levels. 

Firstly, via domestic Jihadists, who have proliferated in the post-revolutionary climate. Such groups, could carry attacks against western interests in the country, or against the regime if it is seen cooperating with the enemy. Furthermore, such attacks would not be reassuring to any potential foreign investors.

Secondly, there is as the risk of the country becoming a ‘corridor’ for weapons and Jihadists from Libya operating in the region. Armed Groups have been active on the border with Algeria even prior to the intervention, but the conflict in Mali is likely increase Tunisia’s exposure despite its distance from Mali. 

finally,  reports indicate a number of Tunisian Jihadists are fighting in Mali, and as revealed by the recent attack in Algeria ,11 militants out of 30 were Tunisian. The presence of active Tunisian Jihadist group in the conflict could have a ‘blow-back- effect on the country. The Algerian Jihadists that fought in Afghanistan and their role in the turmoil of the 1990s provide a  good lesson. Additionally, the context of widespread dissatisfaction with the current ruling regime amplifies this risk. The government’s inability to deliver on its promises after two years in power could create a large pool of disenfranchised youths ripe for recruitment by the Jihadists.

As many parties brought to power with the wave of the Arab spring, the current Tunisian government has to move from a mere opposition party to a governing regime. a task that is now further complicated by domestic issues,regional instability, and the weakness of its security apparatus. Not only does this renders It's position vis-a-vis the Intervention in Mali comprehensible,it also highlights the importance of the tiny nation in the Maghreb's current climate of instability.

Houssem Tefiani

Further reading:

http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/tunisia-signs-of-domestic-radicalization-post-revolution

http://carnegieendowment.org/files/tunisia_economy.pdf

NEXT: Tunisia's reaction to the Intervention: Foreign Policy test?

The Tunisian government has expressed unequivocal opposition to the French intervention in Mali. The Foreign Minister Rafik Abdessalem reiterated his country's opposition to 'foreign intervention of any kind'. It would be interesting to compare Tunisia's reaction to the intervention in Mali to the NATO intervention in Libya and gauge the current regime's foreign policy. Furthermore, domestic problems including the threat of local Jihadists should also taken into account to help explain the Tunisian policy.

At this point this only a scribble of ideas. A full piece will be published after a decent research to keep things factually grounded and balanced.

Thoughts and comments are always welcome, a Tunisian perspective is always welcome.

at Maghreb Caravan we aim to only serve the freshest of political Couscous 

Algerian Crisis: Analysis of Algeria's reaction

Algeria's Hostage Crisis:The Algerian Response,Motives and consequences.

The Algerian National Press Agency had released a preliminary assessment on 19/01/2013 stating that 23 had been killed, 32 terrorists neutralized. Nearly 800 hostages were freed including 107 foreigners. However, The Algerian Minster of Communication Mohamed Said, said on 20/01/2013 that these were provisional figures, and the numbers of those killed is likely to be higher (press conference by Prime Minister Sella: 37 foreigners dead). 

The assault came as a surprise to most outsiders, including Washington, London and Paris. All claim not to have been consulted by the Algerian prior to the assault. Yet following the release of information about the scale and overall results of the operation, all have expressed greater support for counter-terrorism efforts in the region. Given that the intervention in Mali still requires Algeria's support is perhaps another reason for the change in rhetoric.   

Many observers have deemed the Algerian response heavy-handed  or brutal.The Minister of Communications summed up Algeria’s policy with respect to negotiations quite clearly when he stated: “No negotiation, no blackmail and no respite against terrorism”. However, an overview of Algeria’s historical legacy, the current regional dynamics and factors specific to the crisis at In Amenas provide a better understanding of Algeria’s hard-line policy and actions.

The Algerian Army launched the assault on the gas installation south  east of the capital Algiers after a group of Jihadists calling themselves the ‘Signers in Blood’; took over the installation and captured over 600 hostages including a large number of foreigners. The operation lasted over three days and details are starting to slowly emerge. 

Historically, Algeria’s ‘dark decade’ continues to shape the country’s counter-terrorism policy. Throughout the 1990s, the country armed forces fought Islamist Militant in a bloody war with casualties including a large number of civilians. During the crisis, the ruling military establishment- Algeria’s core centre of power- was divided into two camps: those in favour of dialogue and the ‘eradicators’. Despite a return to civil rule, it is the latter that continue to hold key posts in the country’s security apparatus.

After more than a decade of fighting, and a brokered political solution, the country managed to push what it labels ‘residual terrorism’ south of major population centres and into the Sahel region. It is around this time that the rules of the game changed for both the armed Islamist- now franchised Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) - and for the government. In 2003 European tourists were taken hostage and released upon an alleged ransom payment. The same group went on to perpetrate the country’s first suicide attack in 2007. Thus, Algerian authorities see any negotiation or interjection from outside countries as not only a breach of sovereignty, but also a direct security risk stemming from better armed groups.

The assault should also be seen in the larger context of instability in the region and the implications of this for the Algerian ruling regime. Firstly, Civil war in Libya brought instability and heightened the threat of Islamist armed militants on the country’s eastern flank, where Algeria’s oil and gas operations are most concentrated (fig.1). Furthermore, instability in Northern Mali became an additional source of insecurity. The vast porous borders-imaginary lines in the sand- and the inherent weakness of bordering states in the region create an ideal operating environment for armed groups. This helps both explain Algeria’s push for a political solution in Mali as well as its harsh response at home.

Figure 1

The attack on the gas installation itself constitutes a first in the country’s history. These were largely untouched during the instability of the 1990s. The country’s economy is largely based on its oil and gas exports, which account for over 90% of all exports. The In Amenas installation itself accounts for 10% of Algeria’s gas production and nearly 20% of its exports, all in an economy dominated by the public sector. Thus the oil and gas exports are not only the backbone of the economy, but the pillar of political and social stability for the country. The militant attacked a core interest or as Dr. Geoff Porter put it: ‘the golden goose that keeps the regime’. In this light, the Algerian overwhelming response should be regarded as clear message to both militants and outside powers. 

In the aftermath of the operation of In Amenas, a number of questions remain to be answered including what exactly happened at the gas facility and how a security breach of this scale was ever possible. Early reports indicate the use of embedded operatives by the militants to gain strategic intelligence inside the plant and the whereabouts of foreign employees. One Algerian employee reported that the militant knew their way around and had even known about a planned strike.

How this will affect Algeria’s stance on the Mali conflict? Past behaviour and the current policy points towards a more ‘hunker-down bunker-up’ Algerian response. The Algerian government is maintaining its usual silence, but greater involvement cannot be ruled out. Reports show the Algerian Air force has been put on standby, and additional troops have been dispatched towards the Malian border.

Chafik Mesbah Interview

In my opinion one of the most respectable academics and analysts of Algerian affairs. It's translated by Google but the ideas are easily understood and present, but if a more thorough translation is requested , i will make it happen.


Mesbah Mohamed Shafik, senior officer of the ANP retired political scientist and analyst in international relations and strategic questions, answers our questions about the current situation in northern Mali.


The military option open by France you think she an appropriate response to the current crisis in northern Mali?

It is difficult to provide a definitive answer to this question. It was clear from the outset that the phenomenon of terrorism appeared in Mali, particularly in the Sahel and in general can not be solved by a single open solutions. It was prospect, no doubt, the path of political dialogue to expand the internal national consensus against terrorism and isolate radical groups using precisely the violence. It would have been childish, however, believe that these terrorist groups would resign himself passively to a reversal against them, the balance of forces. The military solution was perspective ignored.

What is discordant with respect to the initial scheme is that France took suddenly the initiative to engage, only to meet an emergency situation characterized by the risk control all Malian territory by terrorist groups present in Northern Mali. In the original script, it was a classic approach with an international mandate from the United Nations to cover the implementation of military means. In this case, it is France's colonial past lackluster, which comes only with the complicity of Algeria against nature which may squander all its diplomatic prestige accumulated since the war of national liberation. To legitimize the French intervention, it is reported an express request by the Malian government. Frankly, Mali, failed state, would have, therefore, a legitimate government - very legitimate - able to make such a request ...


The Algeria ranks behind the French military intervention in northern Mali after the solution advocated dialogue. Can we talk of a turnaround in the Algerian position?

Level intermediate bodies in appliances diplomatic, military and security Algerian changing events can be seen as a reversal. The good faith of the officials involved in these devices is not involved. It is at the political level of the state polling is permitted. With mass exchanges between Algeria and international parties involved in the crisis in northern Mali, the assumption of military intervention was obviously included from the outset among the range of open solutions. To a large extent, senior Algerian diplomats, military and intelligence officers have been duped since all their efforts have been focused deliberately on the political crisis.

At the precise moment discussing probably the implicit agreement between Algeria and France on the French military intervention in Mali with the use of the Algerian airspace by military aircraft of the French army! What you consider to be a change, it could be a gradual adaptation of the doctrine Algerian diplomatic and defense policy of Algeria to the requirements of the new strategic context in the Maghreb and the Sahel, or the Mediterranean. It is not this type of development - in size, highly strategic - can escape the vigilant attention of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, broke all the secrets of how the system of international relations.

Algeria, under the scrutiny of the Western powers, is taking up a regional security system where it may unfortunately be embroiled with, subsequently, an inability to exercise its national sovereignty. What is happening in northern Mali resulting directly from the desire to integrate Algeria, by force if necessary, a mechanism in which it will no longer be free.


How to explain the strange deficiency that affects corporate communications since not a single Algerian Algerian official has yet eminent expressed on this turnabout?

There is a direct correlation between the Algerian position vis-à-vis the crisis in northern Mali and the moribund system of governance in Algeria. It is an open secret, diplomatic decision in Algeria is the sole determination of the President of the Republic. As everyone knows, the Minister of Foreign Affairs acts as a proxyholder. He is obliged to refer to the President of the Republic for any decision diplomatic. Its scope is non-existent and it can take initiative, proactive thinking on the strategic course of events. Which is valid for the Minister of Foreign Affairs is, a fortiori, to other senior state officials who are prohibited from interfering with the reserved area - reserved for really - the Head of State. They can not, a fortiori, communicate this register. We are far from the crisis in northern Mali. The real crisis is that the system of governance in Algeria!


What concrete impact should expect the closure, Algeria, its borders with Mali?

A reduced impact. To be honest, the border remains porous. Know that the border between Algeria and Mali stretches 1376 km. For the record, it extends over 956 km to the border that separates Algeria from Niger. In addition, the Sahel, a band homogeneous in terms of population and geography, is a state difficult to control potential. It is virtually impossible to close the Algerian border with Mali. This is certainly not a new "Berlin Wall". Indigenous peoples are accustomed to ignore plots border and terrorist groups have quickly learned from this special relief in adapting to it. You can probably imagine that Algeria could deploy a soldier every meter to make the border sealed, or Western states put into action enough drones to monitor every acre of this potential theater of operations.

As a guide, it should be noted that the deployment of border guards groupings within the Gendarmerie could never ensure neutralization of smuggling, main source of income for local people. Mobile transport available to terrorist groups and their perfect knowledge of the terrain that they make sure the ridiculous closure of the border with Mali. Observe, for instance, what happens to Amenas. This is a real Berezina. Unfortunately, Berezina that involves even the military and security apparatus in the country.


But at this point, the terrorist attack against the base oil of Amenas you think she more focused Algeria or France and its Western allies?

Both simultaneously. It is clear that France and its Western allies are now targeted by terrorist groups nebula located in the area. Algeria is also, which opened its airspace to French military aircraft, is subject to reprisals. What may be surprising in this unfortunate episode is the ease with which a terrorist attack occurred against a sensitive installation in an area not less sensitive. Appropriate steps to protect these sites Were, whether or not made? The result perplexing should encourage the government to review the security arrangements put in place in the Southern Algeria. Amenas? This is the precursor to the fire that may affect the Sahel, including the Algerian territory is its extension strategy.


Is it therefore possible to say that Algeria has failed in its efforts to impose a political solution to the crisis in Mali?

Probably. Western powers have suggested, formally, they supported the Algerian approach advocating dialogue. In fact, the Western powers have always been hard at work planning the planned military intervention. Naive or ignorant, Algerian officials thought they could play on the antagonism France-United States of America. Often they consult with their Russian counterparts or Chinese whereas the world is still in the division between socialist and capitalist blocs. Algeria has not only failed in its specific approach vis-à-vis the crisis in Mali. Algerian diplomacy is, overall, in chronic crisis with major loss of efficiency in all its actions.


The theater, itself, how could evolve in practice the situation?

The situation may change, probably to the stalemate and kindling. It is unlikely that military intervention can overcome classic of guerrilla warfare. The military has come up with two key actions. First, an action closer to local communities in order to create a form that penalizes local terrorist groups in isolation. These terrorist groups should be forced to evolve in hostile terrain. Not only because of the military above-mentioned, but because of the rejection of indigenous peoples. Second action, the impulse of economic and social development in Azawad, in general, with the implementation of a real mini-Marshall Plan. As you can see, we are far from it.


Under the new situation in northern Mali, an Algerian military intervention becomes an option for it?

Instead, this option seems unlikely. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika does not seem to be able to win the support of the military in a process that does not seem even consensual. This form of acceptance of the fait accompli by the military might have limits. It is not in the tradition of the Algerian army to intervene in theaters of operations. The Constitution prohibits it, but also the mindset inherited from the War of National Liberation. Push the Algerian army to engage in this theater of operations is the risk of causing insubordination of military leaders. It is difficult to imagine that President Abdelaziz Bouteflika can go to that extreme.


In consideration of the Algerian conciliatory position vis-à-vis France in northern Mali, which could take as profit Algeria, or if the President Abdelaziz Bouteflika?

Observers have noted, during his last visit to Algiers, the laudatory tone of President François Hollande vis-à-vis his Algerian counterpart. Conversely, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika has refrained from any public during this visit, taking care not to discuss the sensitive claim of repentance. On the one hand, we have a French president stumbles to a loss of reputation in public opinion in his country where economic lobbies French show a greedy thirst to capture the Algerian market. On the other, we have a system Algerian crisis which ensures its sustainability by the indiscriminate distribution of oil revenues and support, ostentatious Western powers. French President wanted to restore his popularity and better sit his presidency's interest to conclude the agreement must be implied - as required - with his Algerian counterpart which, in turn, is essential to maintain order in office in preparing for the end of the presidential election of 2014 he wants to make a crown for his career.


Finally, how do you explain the failure of the Algerian diplomacy patented?

Firstly, it is necessary, absolutely distinguish between the failure of the Algerian diplomacy and how to use the Algerian diplomats, their motivation, their skills and experience. They are not the ones who are involved. Some are even brilliant. These are the diplomatic apparatus with its operation and the doctrinal foundations of the Algerian diplomacy that are at issue. This is not the place to spread this major crisis of the Algerian diplomacy. Suffice it to record three major aspects:
- Lack of strategic anticipation. Or inside the diplomatic apparatus, or in cooperation with public institutions involved in foreign policy, let alone with universities or academic research centers, there are no activities related to knowledge prospective events foreign policy;
- Lack of national consensus on the objectives of the foreign policy of Algeria. The Head of the State monopolizes his hands all diplomatic decisions uses his Minister of Foreign Affairs as an administrative assistant. The heads of public institutions involved in foreign policy of Algeria are not more involved in the decision making diplomatic. Personalities and political parties as well as organizations working in the trade unions are hardly consulted about policy or foreign policy decisions of Algeria;
- Lack of responsiveness of the Algerian diplomatic apparatus. Nature, purely bureaucratic process of decision making with authoritarianism bordering on derision from the bottom to the top of the hierarchy, there is no leeway for Algerian diplomats as effective they can be. Their audacity potential is constrained by a relentless administrative straitjacket which refers to the totalitarian Stalinist period.


Former senior officer of the ANP had to deal with the defense doctrine of Algeria, do you really think there is an alternative to the strategic alignment of the Western camp?

You interpellez me as a former senior officer of the ANP? You allow me, in short, to get rid of my academic status? Be. I was impregnated throughout my military career, a patriotic sentiment remains rot in my heart. I'm not stupid, however, as to imagine that Algeria can continue to adorn the protective mantle only Russian. I'm not stupid to the point of considering the hackneyed slogans of non-alignment is still needed. Now there is no longer an alternative to strategic dialogue with the West. Under this issue, I fed other ambitions in Algeria as a country to be a subcontractor - State aid - serving interests neo-colonialist or imperialist, as appropriate.

To solve the equation and put the positive alternative exists. We need to reform the current system of governance which is characterized by the choice of officials with powers beyond acting but overall popular control. We need a political system regeneration because it takes passionate love for his homeland to serve well. Better if some people think like me.

Today's headlines over Algerian Hostage crisis... article in progress, waiting for a clarification on what happened on the ground..

Algerian Minister of Communications clarifications:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=kFRpucGFg0U

No mention of number of casualties, or any real clarifications at this time. perhaps a little post explaining the Algerian Army's actions and the repercussions this would have on Algeria and the current situation in Mali.

French Intervention In Mali: Trap?

French intervention in Mali: Avoiding the entanglement trap lies beyond French control.

 France has entered the Malian conflict this week following a surprise rebel offensive on the south of the country. The fall of strategic towns in rebel hands and the Malian Military’s inability to contain the assaults prompted the French to mobilize troops and aircraft to stem the rebel advancement towards the capital Bamako. France bombarded rear rebel positions in their stronghold of Gao & Kidal and deployed ground forces around the capital Bamako and the Mopti Province.

 The situation bares the hallmarks of a modern conflict: a transnational network of Non-state armed groups fighting a weak governments in an area that stretches across an entire  Sahel region with porous borders that are essentially imaginary lines in the sand: a remnant of France’s colonial past.

 Commenting on how long his country will take the lead in the campaign “It’s a matter of weeks” declared French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius. The government insists that its current presence on the frontline of the conflict is a temporary measure that aims to contain the rebel advance until African troops from ECOWAS are deployed. However, such promises will be hard to keep as factors deciding how the conflict plays out lay beyond the French army’s control.  A closer look at the actors, the dynamics of the conflicts, suggest that the French army could easily be lured into deeper involvement if clear and limited objectives that fall within the UN intervention mandate are not maintained.
  

 Due to the logistics and coordination necessary, the original intervention plan did not foresee a deployment of 3,300   regional forces (a number deemed too low by some military quarter) until September 2013. The preemptive assault by Islamist was an attempt to capitalize on this since the capture of significant territory would provide considerable strategic leverage on both  the ground and at the negotiating table. As stated previously, this is what precipitated French involvement, refuting earlier assurances by the French President Francois Holland that there would be “no French boots on the ground”. Moreover, French authorities acknowledged that the militants have turned out to be better-armed and equipped than initially thought after a French combat helicopter was downed by the rebels.  Current plans anticipate a deployment an additional 2,500 troop.

 French Defense minister Le Drian described his country’s action in broader terms such as the eradication of terrorism in the region and has recently acknowledged the likelihood of a lengthy campaign.  According to retired French General Vincent Desportes, France is currently pursuing three objectives: the securitization of French nationals and the capital, holding the frontline around Konna (700kms from Bamako), and training troops from Niger, Burkina, Bénin, Togo and Sénégal to recapture the north of Mali.

 In the short term, France has for the most part fulfilled the first two; however, the ‘Africanization’ of the intervention through full deployment, coordination and training of Malian and ECOWAS forces in short period of time is a significant endeavor with numerous hurdles. At this point in time the Malian military remains weak, with the French military like to bear the brunt of the work. Furthermore, the deployment of ECOWAS troops likely to arrive this week is also expected to encounter complications due to the premature timing vis-à-vis the initial plans. The conflict has already spilled over into neighboring countries, including the regional power Algeria that suffered an attack on a gas installation on 16 January 2013.

 Algeria possesses the strongest military in the region with experience fighting armed islamist groups within its borders. It has always expressed reservation with respect to a military intervention in Mali. However, its advocacy for political dialogue with the main Islamist group Ansar-Eddine is likely to be reversed following an attack deep within its territory in retaliation for opening its airspace. The attack resulted in numerous hostages constitutes a first for the country. Such installations never suffered even during the troubled 1990s. The distance of the base relative to the Malian border (near In Amenas) is closer to Libya, again reinforcing the relative insignificance of political borders in the region, their porous nature and the potential vastness of the theater of operations.

 France should not expect much from Algeria. Despite having the strongest capabilities in the region these remain relative to inherently weak states in the Sahel such as Mali. Though direct involvement beyond its borders would provide a boost in capabilities, these remain untested beyond Algeria’s borders, and are likely to be dedicated to reinforcing the securitization of its own borders.

 The dangers of France finding itself entangled in a long conflict that stretches across the Sahel are real, and lie beyond its control. Worst case scenarios for France would be the being sucked into its own Afghanistan, or a debacle similar to the US involvement in Somalia. The effect and quality of deploying of ECOWAS troops is a determining factor but remains to be seen. France is better off sticking to limited objectives in the short term or faces the prospects of its own Afghanistan.

Houssem Tefiani.